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Abstract 
Modern distribution systems often stretch beyond national borders such that a highly-visible product 
failure in a single country may negatively influence the reputation and market share of all identifiable 
supply chain members-even those that are blameless-in multiple countries, especially when the product is 
related to food safety. This study considers how Fonterra's response to its 2013 bacterial contamination 
crisis influenced its own reputation and that of the New Zealand dairy milk industry. It first traces how 
the crisis started in March 2013 and how it ended in August when investigations showed that the bacteria 
found did not cause botulism, a fatal disease that attacks the nervous system. It generally appears that 
Fonterra's initial response was unpersuasive but, over time, it stepped up its crisis management efforts. 
 
Keywords: China, crisis management, Fonterra, food safety, milk contamination, New Zealand, 
reputation management, Sanlu, supply chain safety 
 
 
 
Modern distribution systems connect suppliers, manufacturers, retailers, and consumers within a single 
country, between countries, and across continents. In the case of distribution systems that supply food or 
inputs to food production, a single failure in the sanitation process can be harmful to the well-being of 
large numbers of consumers over vast geographic areas. 
 
As consistent food product quality is critical to consumer trust, a single failure is likely to greatly damage 
the reputation of all identifiable entities–even those that are blameless–within the distribution system, 
including in some cases the country's reputation where the defective food product originated. The degree 
of reputational harm and damage to market share may vary depending on a variety of factors, including 
prior reputation and product quality history, vulnerability of the target market such as milk for children 
(cf. Ye & Pang, 2011), the availability of substitute products, and how the entities involved in the product 
failure respond–and are seen by the public to respond–in managing the crisis. 
 
On July 31, 2013, New Zealand dairy food giant Fonterra confirmed that there was bacterial 
contamination in its products that could cause botulism, a fatal disease that attacks the nervous system–
four months after they knew about it. This study examines how Fonterra responded to four key issues: 
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1. Accounting for the delay in releasing the contamination news and failure to inform affected 
consumers when the first hint of contamination surfaced; 
2. Placating the Chinese market where Fonterra planned to attain a larger market share as Fonterra 
had earlier been publically implicated in the 2008 Sanlu milk crisis due to having an ownership 
stake in Sanlu; 
3. Accounting to the Government for tarnishing New Zealand's image as the New Zealand 
Government was furious that Fonterra had compromised the good image of the country; and  
4. Tarnishing the quality and image of New Zealand-made products. 
 
This study traces the time line of how the current crisis started, on March 31, 2013, to how it ended in 
August when investigations showed that the bacteria found did not cause botulism. This study first 
examines how Fonterra accounted for the four-month delay in response. Second, it examines what 
strategies Fonterra used to repair its image with China and what strategies Fonterra used to repair its 
image with the New Zealand Government. Third, it examines the effectiveness of the strategies used. 
Based on the findings, the study also examines the impact on New Zealand's reputation after the crisis. 
 
Data come from textual analysis of articles from prestige newspapers in New Zealand (New Zealand 
Herald), which represents New Zealand's perspective; China (China Daily), which represents China's 
perspective; United States (New York Times), which represents American and international perspectives; 
and Singapore (Straits Times), which represents the Asian perspective. News releases representing 
Fonterra's presentation of its positions were also examined. 
 
This study is significant as rarely is there such a juxtaposition of diverse crisis “faces” embedded in a 
case: First, it is a case where a corporate silence of four months in the hope it would go away backfired. 
Second, it is a crisis that impacts both an organization's image and a nation's image. Third, it is the type of 
crisis which Coombs (2010 Coombs, W. T.) described as originating in a “host” country (p. 722) but with 
cross-border implications, or what Molleda and Quinn (2004) would call “cross-national conflict shifting” 
(p. 1). Insights can benefit practitioners wishing to manage crises at both local and global levels in a more 
effective manner. 
 
BACKGROUND: THE FONTERRA CRISIS 
Bacterial Contamination 
In May 2012, Fonterra's Hautapu site located in Waikato, New Zealand, produced 38 tonnes of whey 
protein concentrate (also referred to as WPC80 in some sources) used to supplement the nutrition in their 
products with a dirty pipe that contained the bacteria Clostridium botulinum (C. botulinum hereafter). All 
products produced with the whey protein concentrate (e.g., Nutricia Karicare) passed food safety tests and 
were cleared for sale at that time, and most was sold to eight Fonterra customers in six countries—
Australia, China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Vietnam (Mullany, 2013). In March 2013, new 
tests were done and some final products were found to have elevated sulphite reducing clostridia (SRC) 
levels, suggesting a potential quality issue (Associated Press, 2013). Although most strains of Clostridium 
bacteria are harmless, high levels of Clostridium requires close monitoring for the possible presence of 
harmful strains such as C. botulinum. 
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From March 2013 to June 2013, Fonterra, with other research organizations, conducted a series of tests to 
investigate the presence of C. botulinum (Board of Fonterra, 2013; Scoop Business, 2013; Wade & 
Shuttleworth, 2013). The bacteria can cause botulism, a fatal disease that attacks the nervous system. 
Symptoms of botulism include nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea followed by paralysis; it can be fatal if not 
treated. On July 31, 2013, the presence of C. botulinum in whey protein concentrate samples were 
confirmed (Economic Observer, 2013). 
 
Fonterra immediately contacted the eight customers and informed related authorities (One News, 2013). 
On August 2, 2013, Fonterra notified New Zealand's Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) of the 
contamination and a precautionary product recall was initiated (New Zealand Parliament, 2013). 
 
Even though FIGURE 1 the crisis happened in New Zealand, China was on the minds of both the 
Fonterra chief executive (CEO) Theo Spierings and the New Zealand Government. CEO Spierings, who 
was in Europe then, flew immediately to China (National Business Review, n.d.). On August 10, 2013, 
New Zealand Prime Minister John Key said he would fly to China (Xinhua News Agency, 2013) to report 
findings of the inquiry on Fonterra food safety. 
 
The C. botulinum crisis also occurred at an inopportune time for Fonterra which had plans to launch its 
own infant formula (i.e., “Anmum”) in China. The plan to market Anmum in China was delayed and 
sidelined for a period of time after the Sanlu contamination became public (Adams, 2013b). Fonterra's 
unfortunate relation to Sanlu as its foreign partner and major stakeholder with a 43% share forced 
Fonterra to delay its plans to launch Anmum in China, which was already being sold in Malaysia and 
Indonesia at that time. The company was also criticized for previously failing to confront Sanlu's 2008 
melamine contamination sooner and more loudly (Tajitsu, 2014). 
 
According to Fonterra, before 2008 the China baby milk market generated more than NZ$700 million in 
annual revenue (New Zealand China Trade Association, 2005). In 2012, the scale of China's infant food 
market was about NZ$10.8 billion (PR Newswire, 2013). In total, the infant milk market in China is 
worth about NZ$15 billion in annual sales and is expected to almost double in value to NZ$28 billion in 
2017 (Smyth, 2014). 
 
The stakes were even higher for Fonterra in 2013 because it was not just representing itself but also 
representing the economy of New Zealand. Fonterra goods account for more than a quarter of New 
Zealand's exports; China is their single biggest market. The importance of China as an export market is 
evident in the fact that the New Zealand dollar fell 1% on the day the contamination problem first 
emerged in August 2013 (Noble, 2014). 
 
Almost one month after the outbreak of the contamination scare, August 28, 2013, the MPI said the 
results of their probe confirmed that the whey protein concentrate manufactured by Fonterra was not 
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contaminated by C. botulinum; instead, it was only C. sporogenes (Gray, 2013) which was harmless and 
nontoxic. These events are summarized in a time line presented in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 Summary time line of events. Note: MPI refers to New Zealand's Ministry for Primary 
Industries. 
 
Melamine Contamination 
As noted previously, the Fonterra C. botulinum crisis was not the first time the New Zealand dairy giant 
was involved in a food contamination crisis. In 2008, Sanlu Group, a Chinese dairy company which was a 
joint venture with Fonterra (which owned 43% of the shares), was found guilty of a large scale melamine-
contaminated milk crisis (Ye & Pang, 2011). Sanlu's infant formula was found to be adulterated with high 
levels of the toxic substance melamine that was used to boost the protein content in the milk products. 
The crisis saw the death of at least six babies and damaged the kidneys of about 294,000 others, causing a 
major dip in trust in China's food safety standards both domestically and internationally, and tarnishing 
China's reputation as a global food exporter (Ye & Pang, 2011). 
 
The Fonterra brand was negatively impacted by the melamine-contaminated milk crisis and by Sanlu's 
poor crisis management. Within a few months after the contamination scandal broke, Sanlu announced 
bankruptcy and its leaders were put on trial by the Chinese Government. Tian Wenhua, the chairwoman 
of Sanlu Group, was sentenced to life imprisonment and three former deputy general managers were 
sentenced to between 5 and 15 years in prison (Ye & Pang, 2011). 
 
The Fonterra C. botulinum crisis inevitably reminded the Chinese public of the disastrous Sanlu episode. 
Fonterra was chastised for its failure to learn from the previous crisis and allowing the mistake to repeat 
itself (China Daily, 2013c). In their study of how the United States and Taiwan governments managed 
natural disaster crises, Low et al. (2011) argued that governments' and, by extension, organizations' 
failure to respond and learn from crises and the use of wrong crisis communication strategies would lead 
stakeholders to change their evaluations of the seriousness of the crises from low to high. The authors 
argued that “the truism remains: One may not have started the fire, but if one has the responsibility of 
dousing the fire but did not, then one is held responsible” (p. 234). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study can be examined from at least three theoretical lenses. They are stealing thunder, cross-
national conflict shifting, and image repair theory. Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
Stealing Thunder 
From a crisis communication perspective, “when an organisation steals thunder, it breaks the news about 
its own crisis before the crisis is discovered by the media or other interested parties” (Arpan & Roskos-
Ewolsen, 2005, p. 425). In other words, stealing thunder is not a reactive approach of responding to 
questions from stakeholders and the media, rather it is a proactive strategy that organizations undertake in 
initiating crisis communication. 
 
The dissuasion strategy of stealing thunder has been widely used in several contexts such as legal, 
political, and organizational (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Dolnik et al., 2003). In the context of lawsuits, 
stealing thunder is most often employed when a defendant's weakness is apparent to an opponent 
(Wigley, 2011). In such a situation, the defendant may then choose to divulge the incriminating 
information first to mitigate the negative evaluation of the jury. Several studies have suggested that the 
stealing thunder strategy can result in more positive jury verdicts, enhanced credibility for the defendant, 
and lower perceptions of guilt (Arpan & Roskos-Ewolsen, 2005). Prior research has found that such 
proactive self-disclosure of weakness (usually a failure or wrongdoing) can lead to more favorable 
evaluations (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Arpan & Roskos-Ewolsen, 2005) and less reputational damage for 
organizations embroiled in crises (Claeys et al., 2013). 
 
The effects and efficacy of stealing thunder have been investigated by several scholars. Arpan and 
Pompper (2003) found that although stealing thunder can result in organizations being perceived as more 
credible by the media, it can also pique the interests of journalists in the story. Their study also indicated 
that the strategy does not have an effect on the framing of stories by journalists. These findings were 
contrary to a study by Wigley (2011) who found that sources that stole thunder were associated with more 
positive frames in news stories and less coverage. Wigley's (2011) findings are consistent with an earlier 
study by Ondrus (1998). 
 
Although the stealing thunder strategy appears to offer a wide berth of benefits, it can backfire. Dolnik et 
al. (2003) argued that its effectiveness can be diminished if the evaluative audience perceives the strategy 
merely as a “gimmick,” thereby discounting the positive effects. 
 
Given that Fonterra could have stolen thunder and broken the news, this study examines why it did not do 
so. That suggests the research question: 
 
Research Question 1: How did Fonterra account for the four-month delay in response? 
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Cross-National Conflict Shifting 
Broadly defined, cross-national conflict shifting refers to the transfer of crises from the country where the 
incident originates to other countries where the transnational organization is headquartered or has 
operations (Molleda, 2011). The concept of cross-national conflict shifting originated from the 
international management literature and was first introduced by the scholars Welge and Holtbrügge in 
1998 (Welge & Holtbrügge, 1998). They explained that “multinational corporations are not just 
confronted anymore with national, but increasingly globally active interest groups, which not only 
observe the behavior of single subsidiaries in the respective host nations, but also the behavior of 
multinationals as a whole” (Welge & Holtbrügge, 2001, pp. 323–324). Their observation suggests that 
transnational organizations and businesses that are faced with crises are confronted with the challenge of 
managing conflicts that may no longer be isolated in their home countries; instead, repercussions can be 
felt in other countries where the organization has visibility and where “interest groups can best push 
through their positions” (p. 324). 
 
Reverse cross-national conflict shifting refers to conflicts that take place in the home country of the 
transnational organization and spill over to other host countries (Molleda, 2011). The extent and impact of 
a cross-national conflict is often dependent on multiple factors in the context of the conflict such as “the 
culture, the economy, the government policies, and the media infra-structure, access and reach” (Molleda 
& Quinn, 2003, p. 3). Organizations facing such crises must negotiate with various publics in different 
geographical and cultural contexts (Molleda et al., 2005). In addition, the effects of such cross-national 
crises often have major ramifications and are of greater magnitude than anticipated as news of crises are 
disseminated and, often, exacerbated by international media outlets through multiple channels (H. Lim & 
Molleda, 2009). 
 
Even though cross-national conflicts present a critical area of study in crisis communication in the global 
environment (Freitag, 2001), there has been a dearth of research focusing on this topic (H. Lim & 
Molleda, 2009). Molleda and Quinn (2004) argued that “a greater understanding of cross-national conflict 
shifting would allow transnational organizations to avoid or diminish the negative effects of conflicts or 
crises that originate in one of its subsidiaries or offices in a host country” (p. 7). In terms of strategies 
used, a more recent study by Bravo et al. (2013) found that the predominant strategy used was evasion of 
responsibility. 
 
The complexity of maintaining and repairing the image and reputation of the organization in crisis is thus 
accentuated in such situations. This presents a challenge for organizations with multinational presence 
which need to “understand the global nature of reputation, communication, and activism” so as to 
“anticipate and handle problems that might cross borders” (Wakefield, 2001, p. 644). 
 
Image Repair Theory 
Image repair theory has been described as the “dominant paradigm for examining corporate 
communication in times of crises” (Dardis & Haigh, 2009, p. 101). An extension of apologia (Coombs et 
al., 2010), the theory asserts that an organization's credibility largely depends on its image. Threats to this 
image and reputation, which are used interchangeably, often necessitate massive efforts to repair it 
(Benoit & Pang, 2008). The image repair theory is divided into five major typologies (Benoit & Pang, 
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2008). They are denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and 
mortification. 
 
Denial 
The first major typology, denial, has two variants: simple denial or shifting the blame to another party. 
The purpose of the latter strategy is to position the accused as the victim. 
 
Evasion of Responsibility 
The second major typology is evasion of responsibility. The first variant is provocation, where one reacts 
when forced by an offending party to do so. The second is defeasibility, when one argues its case on the 
basis of lack of information and control. The third is accident, where the “accused” states that the accident 
happened unintentionally. Last is good intention, where one argues that the offensive act was done with 
good intentions. 
 
Reducing Offensiveness 
The third major typology is reducing offensiveness. One can do so by bolstering, which seeks to highlight 
one's positive traits. Minimization strategies can also be used to reduce the severity of the situation. 
Differentiation strategies seek to reduce offensiveness by suggesting that the act was less offensive than 
perceived. Transcendence strategies seek to place the situation at a higher level, with more important 
concerns. Attacking the accuser seeks to reduce the credibility of the accusations. Compensation strategy 
is where those responsible decide to offer something of value to the victims. 
 
Corrective Action 
The fourth typology is corrective action. This typology aims to reassure stakeholders that such crisis 
situations would not reoccur. 
 
Mortification 
The final typology is mortification. Here one admits one's mistake and seeks forgiveness. Given the cross-
national nature of the crisis, this study seeks to examine: 
 
Research Question 2A: What strategies did Fonterra use to repair its image with China? 
 
Research Question 2B: What strategies did Fonterra use to repair its image with the New Zealand 
Government? 
 
Research Question 3: How effective were the strategies used? 
 
 8 
 
 
Corporate and Country Reputation 
Reputation is defined as the “perceptual representation of a company's past actions and future prospects 
that describe the firm's appeal to all of its key constituents” (Fombrun, 1996, p. 165). As an organization 
relates with multiple stakeholders, the conceptualization of reputation typically is one which is collective 
and multidimensional. An organization's reputation is determined by its stakeholders based on both past 
behavior of the organization and what people say about the organization. Therefore, in a crisis event, 
one's reputation can be threatened when criticism against the organization surfaces, especially when the 
organization is perceived to be responsible for the misdeed. Coombs and Holladay (2002) hold that an 
important goal in crisis management is to protect one's reputational assets. 
 
Aside from businesses, nations can have reputations, too. Chua and Pang (2012) argued that globalization 
has intensified the interaction and interdependency among countries, thus heightening the need for nations 
to maintain their good reputation. Mercer (2010) referred to this as the “collective judgments of a foreign 
country's image and character that are then used to predict or explain its future behaviour” (p. 6). For 
instance, national reputation can influence purchase decisions regarding products produced in certain 
countries (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2001) based on the often studied country-of-origin effect. This effect is 
defined as the influence the country of manufacture might have on the consumer's choice processes and 
subsequent behavior (Samiee, 1987). Studies have found that country of origin is of considerable 
influence on the quality perception of a product (Piron, 2000). However, the reputation of the country of 
origin can be both an asset and a liability especially in the case of a product-harm crisis. 
 
This crisis negatively impacted New Zealand's reputation as a major producer of high-quality dairy 
products. A positive reputation is accepted as an intangible but important asset both of organizations and 
industries worldwide, especially so in the industries associated with the food supply chain and 
emphatically so in a food supply chain providing products for infants and children. A favorable reputation 
is strategically important to an organization because it highlights its attractive attributes and guides 
stakeholder decisions and behaviors (Fombrun, 1996). Markham (1972) believed that a favorable 
reputation attracts good employees, attracts shareholders' investment, and retains customers for the 
organization: Robert and Dowling (1997) concluded that reputation correlates with superior overall 
returns. Therefore businesses worldwide should carefully manage their reputation to ensure their source 
of competitive advantage in the market (Cornelissen, 2011). It seems reasonable for this thinking to apply 
to national industries as well. This study thus examines: 
 
Research Question 4: How did the crisis impact the reputation of New Zealand's dairy industry and 
the country after the crisis? 
 
METHOD 
This study employs textual analysis of news reports, the prevalent and primary method of analysis in 
image repair studies (Benoit, 2000). This qualitative method allows the researcher to make an educated 
guess about the likely interpretation of the text (Garyantes, 2006). These texts were analyzed based on the 
categorizations of image repair strategies. The selection, emphasis, and exclusion of texts enable the 
researcher to grapple with the complexities, nuances, and contradictions of media artifacts (Durham, 
2005). 
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Data Collection 
Data was mainly collected beginning August 3, 2013, the day after Fonterra announced the contamination 
of its milk powder. Data collection essentially ended August 31, 2013, after affected products were 
claimed to be C. botulinum risk-free. 
 
To reduce the potential bias of examining articles from a single newspaper, several elite and prestigious 
English-language newspapers were selected. Prestige newspapers are used here primarily because, as 
Krippendorff (2004) argued, they set political agendas and lead public debates. Riffe et al. (1998) hold 
that prestige newspapers are valid instruments for analysis because they play a “key role in history” (p. 
86). 
 
To capture viewpoints from multiple countries and stakeholders, it was necessary to examine relevant 
articles from several national and regional perspectives. As noted previously, data came from textual 
analysis of articles from prestige newspapers in New Zealand (New Zealand Herald), representing New 
Zealand's perspective; China (China Daily), representing China's perspective; United States (New York 
Times), representing American and international perspectives; and Singapore (Straits Times), which 
positions itself as an ardent China watcher and as representing the Asian view (L. Lim, 2002).11 
Additionally, news releases from Fonterra were also examined to obtain the company's official public 
view. 
 
All data were collected online. Key words used for the search included “Fonterra botulism,” “Fonterra 
scare,” and “botulism risk.” The majority of the articles were retrieved from the New Zealand Herald and 
China Daily. Fewer articles appeared in the New York Times (six articles) and the Straits Times (four 
articles). In all, 212 articles and news releases were retrieved. 
 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis was carried out in three stages, following the approach of Low et al. (2011). The first 
stage was identifying the key issues and how the crises developed as issues form the researcher's theme 
(Stake, 1998). The key issues were identified through a careful reading of news articles. 
 
Once the issues were identified, the second stage involved delineating the time frame to examine how 
each issue developed over time. The reports were further analyzed based on the occurrence of each type 
                                                          
1 The New Zealand Herald is the largest circulating newspaper in New Zealand with a strong emphasis on business. 
It reaches an average daily readership of 208,000 and its weekend edition, the Weekend Herald, remains by far the 
most-read and best-selling newspaper in the country (Rupar, 2006). China Daily is the sole national and official 
English-language newspaper in China with an average daily circulation of 300,000. It provides reliable and 
representative access to the overall approach that the Chinese press takes to cover news events (Stevenson, 1994). 
The New York Times is the “paper of record” (Zelizer, 2002) in the United States. It influences national and 
international narratives and discussion (Manoff, 1985). The Straits Times is the newspaper of record in Singapore. It 
has an average daily circulation of 410,000 (Sim, 2014). 
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of image repair strategy used. The prominence and development of the use of particular strategies were 
plotted against the date to identify patterns in the strategies used and the intensity of image repair efforts. 
 
The third stage was examination of the strategies. The process of evaluating messages was informed by 
definitions from the image repair theory. Zhang and Benoit (2004) argued this examination of the 
relationship of context and the message allows the researcher to make a “judgment of the importance of 
the elements of the message as a gestalt that considers not only simple frequency but also prominence as 
indicated by placement, development, and relationship of ideas in the persuasive messages” (p. 163). 
 
This analysis approach has been found to be rigorous (Chua & Pang, 2012; Low et al., 2011; Plowman et 
al., 1995; Ye & Pang, 2011). We now turn to the relevant findings. 
 
The findings are divided into three phases indicated by the data analysis to answer the research questions. 
Phase 1 examines the height of the crisis, which documented the immediate aftermath when the 
contamination news first broke. Phase 2 considers the investigation, which was marked by the 
implementation of investigations by Fonterra, the New Zealand Government, and the MPI. Phase 3 then 
studies the release of the test results which cleared Fonterra's products of being contaminated. 
 
FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
The first research question examined how Fonterra accounted for the delay in response. The defense used 
by Fonterra to address the tardiness in response mainly took place during Phase 1 when questions of delay 
and the possibility of cover-ups surrounding the contamination were the most intense. Fonterra employed 
the image repair strategies of simple denial, minimization, and defeasibility to defend itself. 
 
Phase 1: Height of Crisis (3–11 August 2013) 
Simple Denial 
At the height of the crisis during the first few days after news of the contamination broke, one of the first 
accusations that Fonterra faced was that it was slow in releasing the contamination news to the public—
four months after the Clostridium strain was detected and more than a year after the contaminated batch 
had been in the manufacturing chain. Fonterra's Managing Director (MD) of New Zealand milk products, 
Gary Romano, denied the accusation that the company had been slow in announcing the news. To justify 
why the contaminated news was not announced earlier, he said 
My understanding is the scientific testing that was done to achieve this result used modern day 
standards of technology. We always want to have done things quicker but the reality is, with 
current technology, that is how long it took. We have some of the most rigorous standards in the 
world. (Wade & Theunissen, 2013) 
 
Furthermore, Fonterra's head of communications, Kerry Underhill, said that he is “not trying to spin. But 
the product in March met all specs [specifications] for customers—it was all certified acceptable—it was 
just about elevated levels—it was not an alarm in March” (Drinnan, 2013). When explaining why the 
 11 
 
 
contaminated whey protein concentrate had been in the manufacturing supply chain for more than a year, 
MD Romano maintained that “at this time [May 2012], the product passed all quality tests” (Adams, 
2013a). 
 
Reducing Offensiveness (Minimization) 
To justify why Fonterra had not alerted the public about the “potential quality issue” when the product 
was tested positive for Clostridium in March 2012, the company wrote in its news release that “there are 
hundreds of different strains of Clostridium, the majority of which are harmless” (Fonterra, 2013a ). 
Perhaps this was a bid to downplay the severity of the contamination. 
 
Evasion of Responsibility (Defeasibility) 
When asked about the lack of information during its initial disclosure and how the error occurred in its 
production process, Fonterra CEO Spierings tried to evade responsibility by insinuating that he lacked 
information and control when the contamination happened. He said “we know what happened, but we 
don't know why” (Deane, 2013). He went on to say that “we don't have direct access to the supply chains 
of our customers, so that required full co-operation” (Deane, 2013). Furthermore, MD Romano used the 
word surprise to describe the discovery of the C. botulinum bacteria and explained that Fonterra only 
found out about the contamination when the company was seeking to use the whey protein concentrate for 
a third-party customer (Adams, 2013a), thus reiterating Fonterra's stand that it did not know about the 
presence of the bacteria until the batch was manufactured and shipped to customers. 
 
FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 2A 
The second research question first examined what strategies Fonterra used to repair its image with China. 
A combination of strategies—reducing offensiveness (minimization), corrective action, and 
mortification—was used by Fonterra in its image repair discourse with China. 
 
Phase 1: Height of Crisis (3–11 August 2013) 
Reducing Offensiveness (Minimization) 
In an attempt to mollify the Chinese market, the Federated Farmers of New Zealand President, Bruce 
Wills, engaged the minimization strategy as he told Chinese consumers that “the recall is limited to just 
one product line and was also precautionary in its nature” and further assured them that “some 2,499,962 
tons of Fonterra product are safe” (China Daily, 2013b). CEO Spierings also mentioned in a press 
conference that there had been no customer complaints or reports of anyone falling ill since the crisis 
occurred (China Daily USA, 2013a). Spierings mentioned that “all stocks are contained. There is little or 
no more risk for consumers” (Deane, 2013). MD Romano added in a separate press conference that the 
amount of contaminated whey found in the milk was small enough to go unnoticed for an adult (China 
Daily, 2013a). The minimization strategy was thus mainly used to downplay the severity of the crisis. 
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Corrective Action 
CEO Spierings said the company was doing all it could to respond to the situation by working closely 
with other companies to locate the products involved and determine the next course of action (Meng, 
2013). Furthermore, he also emphasized that “all products have been located and we are working with 
local authorities, more detailed information will come out soon” (Meng, 2013). 
 
Mortification 
At a media briefing in Beijing two days after the contamination news broke, CEO Spierings apologized to 
the people who had been affected by the issue (Hutchison, 2013). He further expressed his empathy when 
he said 
We really regret the distress and anxiety which this issue could have caused…we totally 
understand there is concern by parents and consumers around the world. Parents have the right to 
know that infant nutrition and other dairy products are harmless and safe. (Wang et al., 2013) 
 
In addition, the Federated Farmers of New Zealand President, Bruce Wills, also apologized on behalf of 
the cooperatively-owned Fonterra. He said “perhaps the one missing word has been ‘sorry.’ On behalf of 
New Zealand's farmers who supply Fonterra, we would like to apologize to our Chinese consumers for 
any concern this recall has caused” (New Zealand Herald, 2013b). 
 
Phase 2: The Investigation (12–27 August 2013) 
Corrective Action 
The New Zealand Government also helped with Fonterra's image repair efforts. In a bid to allay 
consumers' fear and regain their trust in Fonterra's corrective efforts, Prime Minister Key expressed his 
interest in including a Chinese representative, who could possibly be “an eminent Chinese scientist,” to sit 
on the government inquiry to “give them [the Chinese publics] more confidence in their market” (China 
Daily USA, 2013b). 
 
Mortification 
It was during this time that Prime Minister Key also announced plans to visit China to offer his apology 
on behalf of Fonterra. He acknowledged that “it is important to their [Chinese] culture that I go up there 
to offer an apology” and to guarantee that “this won't happen again” (China Daily, 2013c). 
 
Phase 3: Release of Results (28–31 August 2013) 
Corrective Action 
After news of the investigation was revealed, Fonterra's top management announced their decision to visit 
China again to rebuild trust for Fonterra and New Zealand dairy products and affirm [the top 
management's] commitment to supporting the Chinese dairy industry. This was also to “address any 
remaining concern that the stakeholders in China might have” during the visit (China Daily Europe, 
2013). 
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FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 2B 
The second research question also examined the strategies Fonterra used to repair its image with the New 
Zealand Government. Several strategies were used concurrently by Fonterra to repair the image of 
Fonterra and the larger New Zealand dairy industry. Strategies used include evasion of responsibility 
(accident, defeasibility, and good intention), reducing offensiveness (bolstering and minimization), 
corrective action, and mortification. 
 
Phase 1: Height of Crisis (3–11 August 2013) 
Evasion of Responsibility (Accident) 
One of the first strategies employed by Fonterra was accident. CEO Spierings tried to evade responsibility 
by attributing the contamination to an unavoidable mishap. He said “this is a sanitation issue which 
should not happen, but human errors in life do happen” (New Zealand Herald, 2013a). It was revealed 
that the contamination happened due to a polluted pipe in its Hautapu plant in Waikato, New Zealand 
(Zhou, 2013a). 
 
Reducing Offensiveness (Bolstering) 
Bolstering was also used extensively by Fonterra from the onset of the crisis when facing the media. CEO 
Spierings said 
Food safety is Fonterra's number one priority. We take matters of public health extremely 
seriously and we are doing everything we can to assist our customers in ensuring any product 
containing this ingredient is removed from the marketplace and that the public is made aware. 
(Fonterra, 2013a) 
 
In a later media release, he said “I believe Fonterra has acted in a responsible manner, with public health 
at the forefront of our minds throughout” (Fonterra, 2013c). MD Romano also mentioned in a separate 
media interview that Fonterra appreciated how quickly their customers have worked with them during the 
process and “are pleased to be able to reassure consumers of the safety of their products” (Fonterra, 
2013b). 
 
Evasion of Responsibility (Good Intention) 
To justify Fonterra's refusal to disclose the names of the eight customers who were affected by the 
contamination, MD Romano used the strategy of good intention. He maintained that it was not 
“appropriate information” that will be helpful to the public. He said “we do not believe that it would be 
helpful … we do not believe that is what our role is here. Our role is to help our customers have the 
appropriate information” (Wade & Theunissen, 2013). 
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Corrective Action 
CEO Spierings employed the strategy of corrective action by demonstrating support for, and 
accountability to, the New Zealand Government. He said 
We are acting quickly. Our focus is to get information out about potentially affected product as 
fast as possible so that it can be taken off supermarket shelves and, where it has already been 
purchased, can be returned. We are working with New Zealand's regulatory authority—The 
Ministry for Primary Industries—to keep New Zealand and offshore regulators informed. 
(Fonterra, 2013a) 
 
Later, Fonterra Chairman Wilson promised 
We want to make sure that it can't happen again. We want to take steps to build systems and 
procedures across our entire business and the global dairy supply chain to ensure we can learn 
from this experience and avoid putting consumers at risk. (Manning, 2013) 
 
Phase 2: The Investigation (12–27 August 2013) 
Corrective Action 
When announcing to the New Zealand public that Fonterra was undergoing an investigation of its internal 
operation, CEO Spierings said “we are moving quickly and establishing key facts about what has 
happened and, as they emerge, we are taking appropriate action” (Fonterra, 2013d) and further added that 
they “are determined to learn from what happened and make any changes needed to ensure this [the 
incident] does not happen again” (Fonterra, 2013e). Two days later, Fonterra launched a program to 
provide extra “quality assurance” for its plants. CEO Spierings promised that “Fonterra will check, double 
check and triple check, if necessary.” This is to ensure quality and to “build a stronger Fonterra” 
(Fonterra, 2013f). 
 
Another indication of corrective action came from Miles Hurrell, general manager for Fonterra in the 
Middle East, Africa, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. He commented that Fonterra will 
continue to “work closely with New Zealand's Ministry of Primary Industries to provide reassurances to 
customers, consumers and trade partners of the safety of New Zealand dairy products” (China Daily USA, 
2013c). 
 
Phase 3: Release of Results (28–31 August 2013) 
Evasion of Responsibility (Accident) 
When explaining how the contaminated plastic, an item of nonstandard equipment used during 
reprocessing (Adams, 2013b), had entered the whey protein, CEO Spierings cited human error and said 
“it [the plastic] just dropped in” (Adams, 2013b) without elaborating. No further explanation of how this 
occurred was located. 
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Reducing Offensiveness (Bolstering) 
After it was found that the contamination was essentially a false alarm, CEO Spierings engaged in 
extensive bolstering to place the company in a positive light. He said that he believed that Fonterra “did 
the right thing and made the right calls all the way through this [the crisis]” (Gray, 2013). He further 
added that 
Fonterra has built a well-earned global reputation for food safety—our Co-operative is well 
placed, in a wonderful country that is the dairy capital of the world. We have a solid foundation to 
continue to drive our strategy and grow. Fonterra is emerging from this experience with a culture 
of developing more transparency, accountability and retaining utmost focus on food safety and 
quality. (Fonterra, 2013h) 
 
Corrective Action 
Fonterra also took additional measures to ensure the mistake is not repeated. CEO Spierings said 
I have created a new role of Group Director, Food Safety and Quality that reports directly to 
me… We are committed to learning from, and sharing, any findings about how we can improve. 
We will do this in an open and transparent way. (Fonterra, 2013g) 
 
CEO Spierings also assured the public that Fonterra would assume a thorough review of the crisis and “to 
learn from this experience” (Fonterra, 2013g). 
 
Mortification 
Four days after it announced the contamination news, CEO Spierings offered his apology. During a media 
conference in Auckland, New Zealand, he apologized for the “anxiety this issue has caused over the past 
few days… to mums and dads around the world” (Fonterra, 2013c). 
 
FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
The third research question examined how effective were the strategies used. In image repair studies, 
effectiveness can be assessed by examining the consistency of strategies used based on previous studies, 
experts' views, and even poll and financial results (Benoit, 2000; Low et al., 2011; Pang, 2006). It is 
argued that Fonterra's image repair efforts helped to restore its image. However, the effectiveness of the 
strategies used varied depending on the phases of the crisis. 
 
During Phase 1, Fonterra's image repair rhetoric was found to be unpersuasive in mitigating the negative 
repercussions. From the onset of the disclosure of the contamination, there were more questions that were 
raised than answered. When it was revealed that the bacteria had been in the manufacturing chain for 
fourteen months and was only disclosed to the public four months after it had been detected, one of the 
first strategies that Fonterra engaged in was simple denial that it was slow in releasing the news. This 
strategy would have been appropriate if Fonterra was consistent in its defense. However, Fonterra first 
argued that the samples were within acceptable levels but later launched further testing to isolate the 
bacteria, which took a further four months. 
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For the denial strategy to be persuasive, evidence must not be stacked against the accused (Benoit, 1995) 
and the audience must accept the accused's claim (Brinson & Benoit, 1999). However, the argument was 
unpersuasive and cast further doubts among the public about reasons for the long gestation of the crisis 
against the backdrop that Fonterra had been involved in the Chinese melamine-contaminated milk for 
children in 2008 and a dicyandiamide contamination scare a few months before the product safety failure 
of 2013. 
 
In August 2013, Sri Lankan officials detected dicyandiamide in Fonterra milk products, a farm chemical 
used to increase agricultural yields. This chemical substance is toxic to humans in high doses. Although 
Fonterra disputed Sri Lanka's findings, it nevertheless recalled the two implicated milk powders (i.e., 
Anchor full-cream milk powder and Anchor +1 milk powder for children). Therefore, the use of the 
denial strategy in the botulism scare was largely ineffective and undermined by a suspicious public. 
 
Fonterra also used the accident strategy, which proved to be a failure. Clearly, Fonterra was not able to 
convince the public that the act was a one-off incident. Considering that this was the third time that 
Fonterra was involved in a contamination scandal, it was understandable that the public found it hard to 
believe that it was purely a mishap. Some critics in China were unforgiving toward the incident, saying 
“mistakes should not be repeated again, three times and [Fonterra] is out” (New Zealand Herald, 2013c). 
 
During Phase 1, Fonterra also attempted to evade responsibility by using the strategies of defeasibility 
and good intention in its image repair discourse. Unfortunately, defeasibility did not work in Fonterra's 
favor when it confessed that it did not have information about why the contamination happened. The 
public had expected that Fonterra would learn from the previous two contamination scandals. 
 
Fonterra's use of good intention to justify why it did not want to disclose the identities of the eight 
affected customers was also a poor choice. Even if the identity of those involved might not be helpful to 
the public as Fonterra MD Romano reportedly said, choosing to hide the information implicated the 
whole of New Zealand's dairy milk product industry instead of limiting reputational damage to just the 
affected companies. In addition, this failure to be forthcoming added to the perception of the public that 
Fonterra engaged in subterfuge because it was perhaps less transparent than it should be and left final 
consumers without knowledge of how to protect themselves from possibly contaminated product. 
Therefore, the use of defeasibility and good intention were ill-conceived strategies as they only 
accelerated attacks and put Fonterra in an even more adversarial position from a public perspective. 
 
Minimization could only be effective if the accused is able to successfully frame the offensive acts as less 
serious than they appeared (Brinson & Benoit, 1999) or if the evidence was less conclusive (Benoit, 
1995). Although Fonterra CEO Spierings was quoted as saying that although the probability of the 
contamination occurring was “one in millions” and “[Fonterra] cannot take the risk” (Meadows, 2013), 
this defense was unpersuasive. It prompted the public to question why Fonterra failed to be more 
proactive in communicating the problem when the first tests for contamination were made in March 2013 
(Associated Press, 2013) despite claims by CEO Spierings that “food safety is Fonterra's number one 
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priority” (Fonterra, 2013a). Furthermore, despite the reassurance from Fonterra that the recall was 
precautionary and limited to one product line, this assertion did not help to restore consumer faith 
especially given the public belief that Fonterra should have learned safer sanitary procedures from the 
previous two contamination scares. Benoit (1997) has pointed out that the use of the minimization 
strategy could create a backlash, particularly when the problem subsequently erupts as it did here. 
 
In addition to the strategies previously discussed, Fonterra also used reducing offensiveness (bolstering), 
corrective action, and mortification as the crisis progressed. For bolstering to be effective, this strategy 
must relate directly to the charge. A blanket use of bolstering that “food safety is [Fonterra's] number one 
priority” (Fonterra, 2013a) was ineffectual and failed to convince the public to retain the stellar reputation 
in their minds that Fonterra had enjoyed before the Chinese melamine-contaminated milk scandal in 
2008. 
 
The only effective strategies used by Fonterra in the early stage of the crisis were corrective action and 
mortification. CEO Spierings sought to reassure the public that actions have been taken promptly and 
promised to prevent future reoccurrence by providing detailed accounts. This was compatible with the use 
of mortification by CEO Spierings who flew to China to offer his apology. 
 
An opinion poll conducted in the immediate aftermath of the crisis by Sina Weibo, China's version of 
Twitter, showed that 79% of the respondents would not consider purchasing the affected products after 
the incident. More than half believed that the contamination was not merely a one-off accident within 
Fonterra's manufacturing process (Dong, 2013). 
 
Phase 2 of the crisis marked the start of Fonterra's efforts to rebuild its image as it stepped up its image 
repair discourse. The previous distancing strategies were discarded and replaced by an extensive attempt 
at corrective action following the apology made by CEO Spierings in Phase 1. 
 
Fonterra reacted to negative public sentiment by demonstrating its willingness to work closely in Phase 2 
with the New Zealand Government to repair Fonterra's production processes. Detailed accounts of the 
corrective actions were reported in the media to persuade the public that it had established good protocols 
with the New Zealand Government in handling the contamination. In an attempt to revive their battered 
image, the company announced the resignation of MD Romano and Fonterra's board established a 
committee to oversee an inquiry into the contamination scare. A total of four inquiries held by Fonterra 
and the New Zealand Government theoretically added to the persuasiveness of the image repair strategy 
as they underscored the commitment by both parties to build trust in the New Zealand dairy milk brand 
again. 
 
By changing the strategic trajectory to one that centered on its corrective actions in this phase, Fonterra 
did a laudable job in improving the image of the New Zealand dairy milk brand as a whole. Critics in 
China believed that the damage would only be short-term if Fonterra could handle the issue effectively 
(Yao, 2013). 
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Phase 3 of Fonterra's crisis management saw the company using a combination of reducing offensiveness 
(bolstering) and corrective action. Image repair studies indicate these strategies work well in combination 
(Blaney et al., 2002; Brinson & Benoit, 1999). However, considering research question three, although 
Fonterra's image repair efforts were unpersuasive at the initial stage of the crisis, it quickly changed its 
course of action and moved away from the more defensive posture to a more accommodative stance. 
 
If an organization's crisis responsibility is high, distancing strategies may antagonize the public and 
impede the crisis recovery process (Coombs, 2010). The early use of mortification was rather 
incompatible with the use of strategies such as simple denial and evasion of responsibility (defeasibility): 
such a combination of strategies is not persuasive (Benoit & Drew, 1997). With largely persuasive image 
repair rhetoric in subsequent phases, Fonterra emerged relatively unscathed from the C. botulinum crisis. 
(A summary of the situational analysis of Fonterra's strategies is presented in Table 1.) 
 
TABLE 1 Summary of the Situational Analysis of Fonterra's Strategies 
 
Note: The image repair theory is divided into five major typologies. The superscripts indicate the typology of each 
strategy or variant used. They are denial 1, evasion of responsibility 2, reducing offensiveness 3, corrective action 4, 
and mortification 5. 
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The financial results indicated the company's successful recovery in the Chinese market. Three months 
after the onset of the crisis, CEO Spierings said that “Fonterra's sales in China are nearly back to pre-
botulism scare levels” (Financial Review, 2013). This is a significant improvement from the initial two 
weeks after the recall when sales dropped to below 50% of pre-crisis levels. However, experts are arguing 
that sales recovery may not necessarily indicate image repair but rather indicate unfilled market demand 
for the product (Noble, 2014). 
 
According to a Massey University survey of 531 people conducted in October 2013 in China's Lanzhou 
City (the capital of Gansu province), about one third of Chinese consumers did not think milk products 
from New Zealand were very safe, suggesting that the other two thirds did. New Zealand dairy products 
were perceived to be safer than Chinese milk products (Su, 2014) which is not surprising given the 
widespread actual harm to the Chinese babies and children affected by the 2008 melamine-contaminated 
milk. 
 
FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 4 
The fourth research question examined how the crisis impacted New Zealand's reputation as a major dairy 
producer. As the “face” of New Zealand's dairy produce, Fonterra's actions had negative repercussions for 
not only its own corporate image, but also for the larger New Zealand dairy industry reputation. The crisis 
prompted global reaction with media coverage across many countries (including Australia, Saudi Arabia, 
United Kingdom, and the United States) and with extensive media coverage in Asia (Dougan, 2013). 
Furthermore, New Zealand's trade had been badly hit in its key markets, particularly China, which 
accounted for a quarter of New Zealand's NZ$12 billion in dairy exports. 
 
The crisis resulted in a global recall of dairy products from New Zealand. China halted imports of 
Fonterra whey powder and dairy-based powder; Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia banned Fonterra 
products. Other affected countries included Australia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
The reputation of Fonterra was further damaged when the Sri Lankan Government ordered Fonterra to 
recall all of its products under the brand name “Anchor” for containing dicyandiamide, which followed 
closely after the botulism contamination news (Zhou, 2013b). 
 
The scandal saw consumers losing confidence in all Fonterra dairy products. Despite claims by Fonterra 
that none of the recalled milk powder entered the Chinese market, the Chinese were not convinced and 
questioned the quality of the products as these products originated from the same country (Zhou, 2013b). 
New Zealand's “100% pure” slogan was attacked in the Chinese media as a “festering sore” (Edwards, 
2013) resulting in a tarnished reputation for Fonterra and for New Zealand's dairy milk industry in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis. 
 
Several experts provided their insights to the media about the impact of the crisis on New Zealand. 
Professor Liu Wenge from the Central University of Finance and Economics in Beijing and other experts 
reportedly acknowledged the short-term impact of the food safety scare on New Zealand's dairy exports to 
China. However, they added that “the position of the broader New Zealand products will not be shaken 
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among Chinese consumers” as consumers' confidence in domestic brands still remains low. Others were 
optimistic that the market for New Zealand's products would rebound within a short time (Yao, 2013). 
 
Amid the detritus caused by the scare, Fonterra had been commended by the Chinese media as a 
“fundamentally trustworthy company” despite references being made to the melamine-contaminated milk 
scandal in 2008 (China Daily, 2013d). That said, customers in the downstream supply chain as well as 
final consumers must wonder about the disposition of the contaminated product sold to eight customers, 
presumably manufacturers, by Fonterra whose anonymity was protected by Fonterra MD Romano. It is 
not clear if this contaminated product was destroyed prior to use or if it was used in production. If it was 
used in production, it is not clear if the output was destroyed or passed on to the final consumer market 
via innocent retailers. 
 
Although failing to name customers may appear to be an honorable and ethical choice as Fonterra 
protected its blameless customers, it also shielded them from public scrutiny and undermined public 
confidence in the products that they are consuming. The ethical implications of this decision by Fonterra 
not to name their customers who received contaminated product are beyond the scope of this research, but 
do appear worthy of further study by scholars of supply chain and marketing ethics. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In November 2013, the food safety regulatory agencies of China and New Zealand signed an agreement 
to strengthen commitment and cooperation in food safety and quality. According to New Zealand Food 
Safety Minister Nikki Kaye, the agreement between New Zealand's MPI and the China Food and Drug 
Administration will allow them “to work together to enhance food safety, continually improve [the] 
regulatory regimes and enhance the bilateral relationships” (China Daily USA, 2013d). 
 
Furthermore, New Zealand also announced a plan with China to implement a new approach that allowed 
consumers to trace the manufacturing process of a product by scanning the label. This collaboration aims 
to mitigate the adverse impact following the scandal by instilling greater transparency in the 
manufacturing and production chain (Zhou, 2013c). 
 
Although these agreements are positive outcomes of the bacterial contamination crisis, to what extent it 
will heal the global reputational damage to Fonterra or the New Zealand dairy milk industry remains to be 
seen. Fonterra Chairman Wilson was of the view that 
The feedback we have been getting is that people believe we did the right thing in initiating the 
precautionary recall, but at the same time we want to provide every assurance about our food 
safety and quality systems and processes. (China Daily, 2013e) 
 
It is interesting to note that the Chinese consumers are perhaps buying dairy products from New Zealand 
sources not based on confidence in product or supply chain safety, but rather based on the perception that 
New Zealand dairy products are less likely to be a health hazard than the domestic Chinese alternative. 
Clearly, this provides no stakeholder with a desirable situation: Chinese consumers are essentially forced 
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to buy dairy products in which they lack full confidence for now and New Zealand milk product 
producers are confronted with a crisis that may compromise their efforts to maintain market share and 
profitability. 
 
Perhaps this outcome would have been less severe if several problems could have been tackled 
adequately. Jaques (2013) identified several based on the independent committee's report that the author 
of this article has expanded on: 
 
Fonterra was unable to promptly and definitively track affected product; 
 Delay in recognition and escalation to senior management and the board of the risk involved; 
 Failure to “join the dots” between infant food products, consumer sensitivities, and Fonterra's 
global reputation: collectively it is argued these could have limited Fonterra's ability to grasp the 
potential extent of the crisis, thus the delay in response; 
 Crisis management was inadequate for an event of this kind and scale; 
 Early management of the crisis was not well executed; 
 The crisis plan had never been tested at a corporate level: collectively it is argued that this failure 
slowed Fonterra's responses and contributed to managers not being able to grasp the scale of the 
crisis and how it could potentially impact their reputation; and 
 Lack of alignment between Fonterra and the New Zealand Government during the critical early 
phase: together, they could have put up a united front and aligned communication efforts. For an 
organization of Fonterra's size and repute, one can only wonder why it would not be fully 
cognizant that its actions had implications for New Zealand's reputation as well. 
 
Implications 
So, what should Fonterra have done? Based on the crisis management literature and the previous textual 
analysis, several implications for crisis management theory and practice are derived: 
 
1. If there is bad news to be shared, share it soon. The organization has greater control when it needs 
to share bad news compared with the situation created by leaving the information “vacuum” open 
for others to fill (Pang, 2013). Stakeholders would rather hear bad news formally first from the 
organization rather than hear bad news informally first through the “grapevine.” Stakeholder trust 
is eroded when bad news is first reported by other entities; 
2. Ensure consistency of messages when communicating across markets (Pang & Diers, 2012). This 
becomes even more critical when organizations have a presence in multiple countries. With the 
almost global use of social media and the attendant almost instantaneous speed of 
communication, what is communicated in one country may be quickly transmitted to another 
country. Consistency of messages across markets will demonstrate that the organization has a 
united strategy to manage the crisis; 
3. Be aware and sensitive to the multicultural nuances of relevant audiences and the emotional 
upheavals they are likely to face (Jin et al., 2012). Emotion is the new frontier in communicating 
crisis (Jin & Pang, 2010). Understanding stakeholder emotions can help organizations streamline 
strategies to address their specific needs; 
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4. Although using mainstream media (international and local) as strategic platforms to give clarity 
to the situation is important, it is also important to utilize and consolidate one's messages through 
one's platforms, such as via news releases and social media (Pang, 2013). This approach helps to 
project a consistent message and ensure that the organization's message is accessible directly by 
stakeholders; and, 
5. Ensure consistency in the rhetoric and action to build credibility in crisis situations (Chua & 
Pang, 2012). Words and actions go hand in hand. Words without actions are plain rhetoric or 
what many would call “spin-doctoring,” creating a crisis communication environment detrimental 
to stakeholder confidence in the organization's message (Doorley & Gracia, 2015). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study considers how Fonterra's response to its 2013 bacterial contamination crisis influenced 
stakeholder perceptions of Fonterra's reputation and that of the New Zealand dairy milk industry (which 
appeared to be innocent of wrongdoing). Even though the bacterial contamination did not cause botulism 
(a fatal disease that attacks the nervous system) as originally feared, it generated many ripples globally, 
particularly in New Zealand and in China (one of Fonterra's major markets). There appears to be global 
notice of this failure in the dairy products distribution systems involved. 
 
Overall, it seems that Fonterra's initial response was unpersuasive but it did increase its communication 
efforts as events unfolded. However, these efforts to preserve corporate and industry reputation would 
likely have been enhanced if certain principles of crisis management discussed earlier were more closely 
followed. It is hoped the insights gleaned from this study will benefit executives who manage future 
crises across international and cultural boundaries. 
 
One limitation of this study lies in its data sources. Data used were collected from press releases and news 
coverage that might not be able to fully reflect Fonterra's efforts. Multiple research methods (e.g., 
consumer surveys and in-depth interviews of relevant officials) could provide a more thorough 
understanding of the actors if they were available. Therefore, the implications for theory and practice 
should be considered in the context of the case and not be blindly applied without due consideration of the 
situational environment. 
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